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We argue that time-series variation in the maturity of aggregate corporate debt issues arises because
firms behave as macro liquidity providers, absorbing the large supply shocks associated with changes
in the maturity structure of government debt. We document that when the government funds itself
with relatively more short-term debt, firms fill the resulting gap by issuing more long-term debt, and
vice-versa. This type of liquidity provision is undertaken more aggressively: i) in periods when the
ratio of government debt to total debt is higher; and ii) by firms with stronger balance sheets. Our theory
provides a new perspective on the apparent ability of firms to exploit bond-market return predictability
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  I.  Introduction 
  There is substantial year-to-year variation in the average maturity of corporate debt 
issues.  For example, using Flow of Funds data, which covers all forms of borrowing, both public 
and private, we estimate that in 1999, 24.7% of nonfinancial corporate debt issues were “long-
term”—defined as having a maturity of one year or more.  This long-term share fell sharply to 
19.9% in 2000, and then bounced back to a new peak of 30.1% in 2001. 
  What accounts for these movements?  There are a number of prominent theories of debt 
maturity choice, but the majority of these focus on firm-level determinants, and hence do not 
have clear-cut implications for aggregate time-series behavior.  One familiar idea is that firms 
should attempt to match the maturities of their assets and liabilities (e.g., Myers (1977), Hart and 
Moore (1995)).  Indeed, in Graham and Harvey’s (2001) survey of financial managers, this 
emerges as the most highly cited factor in the debt maturity decision.  However, unless there are 
sharp changes over time in economy-wide asset composition, maturity matching has little to say 
about the patterns described above.  Relatedly, Diamond (1991) argues that firms decide on debt 
maturity by trading off the favorable signaling properties of short-term debt against an increased 
risk of inefficient liquidation (see also Flannery (1986)).  But again, this kind of model is more 
naturally suited to making cross-sectional, as opposed to time-series predictions. 
  There is a smaller and almost entirely empirical literature that seeks to explain the time 
series of corporate debt maturity by appealing to “market conditions”, including the general level 
of interest rates, the slope of the yield curve, etc. (e.g., Taggart (1977), Bosworth (1971), Marsh 
(1982)).
1  While this may seem like a more natural avenue to pursue, there is not a fully-
developed theory for why such market conditions should matter.  One possibility is that 
                                                 
1 Several firm-level studies also control for market conditions. See Guedes and Opler (1996), Barclay and Smith 
(1995), and Stohs and Mauer (1996).   2
managers are eager to pump up short-term earnings, perhaps at the expense of long-run value 
(Stein (1989)).   If so, they will tend to borrow at short maturities when the yield curve is steeply 
upwards-sloping, and vice-versa, simply to keep their current interest expenses low (Faulkender 
(2005), Chernenko and Faulkender (2007)).  This may be why survey respondents tell Graham 
and Harvey (2001) that they prefer to borrow at shorter maturities “when short-term interest rates 
are low compared to long-term rates.”  Note that this story can be told in a classical asset-pricing 
setting where the expectations hypothesis of the term structure holds—there is no need to 
introduce predictability in the relative returns on bonds of different maturities.
2 
  An alternative market-conditions story, and one that does rely on a violation of the 
expectations hypothesis, is put forward by Baker, Greenwood and Wurgler (2003), hereafter 
BGW.  They argue that managers time the maturity of their debt issues to exploit the 
predictability of bond-market returns.  That is, they issue short-term debt when the expected 
return on short-term debt is below the expected return on long-term debt, and vice-versa.    
  BGW (2003) offer several pieces of evidence in support of their timing hypothesis.   
However, they do not explicitly spell out either: i) the root sources of bond-market predictability; 
or ii) why corporate issuers might be expected to have a comparative advantage—relative to 
other market participants—in recognizing or responding to temporary mispricings.  Some critics 
have interpreted BGW as claiming that corporate issuers have a forecasting advantage over other 
players, a premise which these critics see as implausible. As Butler, Grullon and Weston (2006) 
put it: “While it is provocative to think that corporate managers may be better able to predict 
interest rate movements than other market participants….most purchasers of corporate debt are 
                                                 
2 Graham and Harvey (2001) also report that managers borrow short when they are “waiting for long-term interest 
rates to decline.” Thus, if managers believe that the level of rates is slowly mean reverting, we might expect firms to 
borrow short when the level of interest rates is high.  Evidence in Baker, Greenwood and Wurgler (2003), replicated 
below, is consistent with this idea.   3
sophisticated investors (for example, banks, insurance companies, and pension funds) who are 
unlikely to make naïve investment decisions.” 
  In this paper, we develop a new theory to explain time-variation in corporate maturity 
choice.  Like BGW (2003), our theory allows for predictability in bond-market returns, and has 
the feature that corporate issuers tend to benefit from this predictability—i.e., they use short-term 
debt more heavily when its expected returns are lower than the expected returns on long-term 
debt.  Crucially, however, we do not assume any forecasting advantage for corporate issuers: 
they have no special ability to predict future returns, or to recognize sentiment shocks.  Instead, 
the key comparative advantage that corporate issuers have relative to other players in our model 
is an advantage in macro liquidity provision. 
  More specifically, our theory has the following ingredients.  First, the bond market is 
partially segmented, in that there are some important classes of investors who have a preference 
for investing at given maturities.  These investors might include, e.g., pension funds, who, based 
on the structure of their liabilities, have a natural demand for long-term assets.  Second, there are 
shocks to the supplies of long and short-term bonds that are large relative to the stock of   
available arbitrage capital.  In our empirical work, we associate these supply shocks with 
changes in the maturity structure of U.S. government debt.  And third, there are arbitrageurs 
(e.g., broker-dealers and, more recently, hedge funds) who attempt to enforce the expectations 
hypothesis, but, who—given limited capital and the undiversifiable nature of the required 
trade—do so incompletely, leaving behind some residual predictability in bond returns. 
  Taken together, these three ingredients imply that bond-market predictability takes a 
particular form: when the supply of long-term Treasuries goes up relative to the supply of short-
term Treasuries, long-term Treasuries must offer a greater expected return. This idea goes back 
to Modigliani and Sutch (1966a, 1966b) and is developed formally in recent work by Vayanos   4
and Vila (2007), as well as by Greenwood and Vayanos (2008), who provide supporting 
evidence.
3  Building on these papers, we add one further ingredient to the story: corporate 
issuers, who have to raise a fixed amount of total debt financing, and who must choose whether 
to issue at short or long maturities. These corporate issuers have no forecasting edge over the 
arbitrageurs, since the government-induced supply shocks are perfectly observable to both types 
of agents.  Rather, what distinguishes the corporate issuers from the arbitrageurs is that they have 
a potentially greater capacity to absorb the supply shocks.  In other words, corporate issuers have 
a comparative advantage in the provision of this particular kind of liquidity. 
  The source of this comparative advantage flows from the logic of the Modigliani-Miller 
(1958) theorem.  To see why, imagine a world in which there are no taxes or costs of financial 
distress, so that firms are indifferent as to the maturity structure of their debt.  If we now 
introduce into this world even tiny differences in the expected returns to short and long-term 
debt, firms will respond very elastically, by varying the maturity of what they issue.  Indeed, in 
the limit, they will do so until the point where any expected-return differentials are eliminated.  
  In a more realistic setting, firms are likely to have well-defined preferences over their 
maturity structures, for the reasons alluded to above, and will view it as costly to deviate from 
their maturity targets.  Nevertheless, to the extent that these costs are modest—i.e., to the extent 
that, in the spirit of M-M, the objective function is flat in the neighborhood of the target—
patterns of corporate debt issuance will still respond elastically to differences in expected returns, 
though no longer to the point of completely eliminating these return differences.
4 
                                                 
3 In related work, Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2008) show that when the overall supply of Treasury 
securities goes up, Treasuries offer a greater expected return relative to corporate bonds. 
 
4 As argued in Stein (2005), the closed-end nature of operating firms gives them an added advantage relative to 
open-end arbitrage funds in terms of their ability to take on long-horizon, undiversified “macro” positions.   5
  In what follows, we develop this theory with a simple model that embeds the limited-
arbitrage logic of Vayanos and Vila (2007) and Greenwood and Vayanos (2008), and adds a 
rudimentary corporate sector.  We then go on to test four broad implications of the theory: 
 1.    Gap filling by corporate issuers: First and foremost, our theory predicts that corporate 
issuance will fill in the supply gaps created by changes in government financing patterns.  When 
the government issues more long-term debt, firms should respond by issuing more short-term 
debt, and vice-versa.  Consistent with this prediction, we document a strong negative correlation 
between the maturities of government and corporate debt.  A rough estimate is that the corporate 
sector fills 30% to 40% of the gap created by a shock to government debt maturity.  This result 
holds in a battery of specifications that: i) use different measures of corporate debt issuance; ii) 
control for contemporaneous interest-rate conditions, credit spreads, and macroeconomic 
variables; and iii) take into account the dynamics of corporate and government issuance. 
  One possible objection to our interpretation of these results is that—counter to the spirit 
of our model—government debt maturity is endogenous, and may be influenced by some of the 
same forces as corporate debt maturity, albeit with the opposite sign. To address this concern, we 
instrument for government debt maturity with the ratio of government debt to GDP.  These two 
variables are strongly positively correlated: when the government’s financing needs are greater, 
it tends to extend its offerings out to longer maturities.  Moreover, it seems plausible that the 
ratio of government debt to GDP—essentially, a measure of the stance of long-term fiscal 
policy—is not itself correlated with the sort of omitted factors that might govern corporate 
maturity choice, and hence is likely to be a valid instrument.  Reassuringly, the results from this 
instrumental-variables approach are nearly identical to our baseline results.     
   2. Time-series variation in gap filling:  If we allow for time-series variation in the 
relative sizes of the government and corporate debt markets, our theory makes an additional   6
prediction. When the government share of total debt is larger, gap-filling behavior by firms will 
be more pronounced, because larger supply shocks imply a larger reward for liquidity provision. 
This prediction is also borne out in the data.  
3.  The cross section of gap filling:  At a micro level, our theory further implies that those 
firms with the smallest costs of deviating from their maturity targets will be the most aggressive 
gap fillers.  To operationalize this hypothesis, we observe that a firm with a strong balance sheet 
(a firm that is relatively unconstrained in its investment behavior) is less likely to pay a price if it 
deviates from its maturity target—thereby taking on, e.g., more interest-rate or refinancing risk—
than a firm with a weak balance sheet.  Thus we would expect firms with stronger balance sheets 
to have maturity choices that respond more elastically to changes in the structure of government 
debt.
5  Using a variety of measures of balance-sheet strength, we confirm this prediction. 
 4.    The origin of corporate market timing ability:  As noted above, BGW (2003) 
document that corporate maturity choices have forecasting power for bond returns, but they do 
not specify the mechanism that drives this relationship.  Our theory suggests that corporate 
actions can be informative because they are a mirror of government supply shocks, which in turn 
are the primitive drivers of expected returns.  Consistent with this, we find that the ability of 
corporate issuance to forecast bond returns is attenuated if government debt maturity is included 
in the forecasting regression.
6    
                                                 
5 This prediction is similar to that of Hong, Wang and Yu (2008), who argue that firms with strong balance sheets 
can act as liquidity providers in their own stocks, by repurchasing shares when prices drop below fundamental value. 
  
6 In spite of these results, we should stress that our model’s implications for expected bond returns are neither as 
fundamental nor as robust as its implications for quantities.  In the M-M limit where firms are indifferent as to the 
maturity mix of their debt, there will be strong quantitative gap-filling behavior, but all predictability in returns will 
be arbitraged away.  Moving away from the limit, this suggests that any predictability we do find may be modest in 
nature, even when the mechanism in our model is key to understanding observed corporate debt maturity.  Thus 
while the predictions for expected returns are of some interest, we do not view them as central for our purposes.  
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  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II outlines our model of gap 
filling.  Section III describes our measures of corporate and government debt maturity. Sections 
IV through VII test the four sets of hypotheses described above.  Section VIII concludes. 
 
  II.  The Model  
  We consider a simple model with three dates labeled 0, 1 and 2.  Short-term interest rates 
follow an exogenous process; one can think of them being determined by either monetary policy, 
or by a stochastic short-term storage technology that is in perfectly elastic supply.  In particular, 
the short-term rate from 0 to 1, denoted r1, is known at time 0. The short-term rate from 1 to 2, 
denoted r2, is random as of time 0, with mean E[r2] and variance Var[r2].  There is also a default-
free long-term bond that pays one unit of wealth at time 2, and that trades at a price of P at time 
0.  P will be determined endogenously, as described below. 
  There are four types of actors in our model: preferred-habitat investors, the government, 
arbitrageurs, and corporations. The preferred-habitat investors can be taken to represent pension 
funds, life insurance companies, endowments or others who have a natural demand for long- 
duration assets.  These investors inelastically demand a dollar quantity L of long-term bonds at 
time 0.  At the same time, the government issues a dollar quantity G of long-term bonds.  In what 
follows, we only need to keep track of g = G – L, which measures the time-0 excess supply of 
long-term government bonds relative to preferred-habitat investor demand.  The quantity g, 
which is exogenous in our model, can be either positive or negative. 
  Next we add risk-averse arbitrageurs who have zero initial wealth.  In equilibrium, they 
buy a dollar amount h of long bonds at time 0, and finance this by borrowing short term.  Note 
that h can also be negative, in which case the arbitrageurs buy short-term bonds financed with   8
long-term borrowing.  Terminal arbitrageur wealth is simply  () ()
1
12 11 wh P r r
− ⎡ ⎤ =− + + ⎣ ⎦.  We 
assume that arbitrageurs have mean-variance preferences with risk tolerance γ, choosing h to 
maximize  [ ] () [ ]
1 2 E wV a r w γ
− − .  Given these assumptions it is easy to show that arbitrageurs’ 
time-0 demand for long-term bonds is given by: 
()
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 (1) 
As in Vayanos and Vila (2007), arbitrageurs borrow short and invest long when long-term bonds 
offer an expected return premium over short-term bonds. Conversely, when the return premium 
is negative, they borrow long and invest at the short rate. 
  Suppose for the moment that we leave out corporate issuers.  The market clearing 
condition is  ()
* hP g = , which implies: 
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Thus, the expectations hypothesis holds, i.e.  ( ) [ ] ( )
*1
12 11 Pr E r
− =+ + , if either: i) g = 0, so that 
government supply matches preferred-habitat investor demand for long term bonds, ii) Var[r2] = 
0, so that arbitrageurs face no interest rate risk; or iii) γ is infinite, so that arbitrageurs are risk-
neutral.  Otherwise, an increase in the supply of long-term government bonds raises their 
expected-return premium. 
  As a quantitative matter, equation (2) implies that supply shocks have the potential to 
generate economically interesting effects to the extent that g is large relative to γ, in other words, 
to the extent that the shocks are large compared to the risk tolerance of the arbitrageurs.  To get a 
sense of the magnitudes involved, note that in our sample, a one-standard-deviation annual shock   9
to the long-term share of government debt is 9%.  The total amount of outstanding government 
debt at the end of 2005 was $4.7 trillion.
7  These numbers imply that, in order to absorb a one-
standard-deviation increase in the maturity of government debt, the arbitrage sector would have 
to go long $423 billion of long-term bonds, funding this position at the short-term rate. The 
annualized standard deviation of excess bond returns is 10%, which implies that this trade carries 
a one-percent value-at-risk (VaR) of approximately $98 billion, assuming normally distributed 
returns.  This $98 billion VaR figure can be compared to the total assets of macro and fixed-
income-arbitrage hedge funds, which were $118 billion and $28 billion respectively in 2005.
8  
Thus it seems likely that the limits of arbitrage identified by Shleifer and Vishny (1997) would 
loom large in this context, especially given that the risk in question is a macro one that cannot 
easily be diversified away.  
The last set of players in our model is a group of operating firms.  We assume that these 
firms collectively need to borrow a total dollar amount C; as will become clear, the parameter C 
effectively indexes the size of the corporate sector relative to the government sector.  Firms raise 
a fraction f (and hence a dollar amount fC) of their needs from long-term debt, and the remaining 
(1 – f) from short-term debt.  Timing considerations aside, their target optimal capital structure 
involves having a fraction z of long-term debt.  If they stray from this target in either direction, 
they incur quadratic costs (in total dollar terms) of θC(f – z)
2/2.  These costs might reflect 
interest-rate exposure or refinancing risk, either of which could lead to a tightening of financial 
constraints, and ultimately, to a reduction in value-creating investment.  In this context, the 
parameter θ can be thought of as a measure of balance-sheet strength.  In the limit where θ = 0, 
                                                 
7 This figure refers to the portion of the national debt held by the public, and excludes intragovernmental holdings. 
 
8 The source for these hedge-fund numbers is Hedge Fund Research, Inc. (HFR). 
   10
the firm in question has a balance sheet that is so strong that it is financially unconstrained in all 
states of the world, and it is therefore indifferent as to the maturity structure of its debt.  At the 
other extreme where θ is large, the firm has tightly binding financial constraints, so that any 
increase in, say, interest-rate risk has the potential to be very costly.   
  In the spirit of Stein (1996), the firm’s objective function is to minimize the sum of 
expected interest costs plus the costs associated with financial constraints. That is, firms solve: 
2
12
( -   )







++ ++ ⎢⎥ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠ ⎣⎦
 (3) 
which has solution: 
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=− . (4) 
The partial equilibrium intuition is that when long-term debt is expensive, i.e., when 
[ ]
1
12 (1  )(1   )  Pr E r
− −+ + is higher, firms deviate from their target debt mix and issue less long-
term debt (f < z). 
  Once we add the corporate sector to the model, the market clearing condition for long-
term bonds becomes  () ( )
** hP gC f P =+ , which implies: 
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We can solve for the equilibrium fraction of long-term corporate debt by substituting (5) into (4), 
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  As above, the expectation hypothesis holds as γ tends to infinity or as Var[r2] goes to 
zero, since in either case arbitrageurs take arbitrarily large long (short) positions in long-term 
bonds if they deliver higher (lower) expected returns than short-term bonds. In addition, as θ  
tends to zero, so that there are no costs of deviating from the target maturity z, firms completely 
absorb any changes in government supply (
* Cf g = − ), and the expectations hypothesis holds 
irrespective of arbitrageur risk tolerance. In such a world, firms respond aggressively to 
government supply shocks, even though these shocks have no effect on equilibrium prices.  
In the limiting case where γ = 0, so that there are no arbitrageurs, the expected-return 
premium on long-term bonds is given by (/) ( ) Cg z C θ + .  This is because there is a net excess 
supply of long-term bonds of (g + Cz) if firms stick to their target debt mix, while θ /C measures 
the (lack of) willingness of the corporate sector to absorb this excess supply.    
  The following four propositions, which follow immediately from equations (4) through 
(6), provide the basis for our empirical work below. 
  Proposition 1: Gap filling.   It is apparent from equation (6) that 
* /0 fg ∂∂ < .  Thus 
when the government issues more long-term debt, firms respond by tilting their debt issuance 
away from long-term debt.  
  Proposition 2: Time-variation in gap filling. Equation (6) also implies that 
2* /0 fg C ∂∂ ∂ > .   This means that gap-filling behavior is more pronounced when the stock of 
government debt is large relative to the stock of corporate debt.  One simple intuition for this 
result is that gap filling is fundamentally a dollars-for-dollars phenomenon.  When C is small 
(i.e., there is relatively more government debt) it takes a larger change in the fractional 
composition f of corporate debt to absorb a given dollar shock to supply.   12
  Although the dollars-for-dollars nature of Proposition 2 makes it sound mundane, it is 
actually a sharply differentiating prediction of our theory.  To see why, consider an alternative 
explanation for gap filling.  One might argue, for example, that government debt maturity is 
itself endogenous, and responds to the same unobserved factors that drive corporate maturity 
decisions, albeit with the opposite sign.   Perhaps the government tends to shorten the duration of 
its debt when it perceives future economic conditions to be deteriorating, while the corporate 
sector does just the reverse.  This could generate 
* /0 fg ∂ ∂<, as in Proposition 1.  But it would 
not generate 
2* /0 fg C ∂∂ ∂ > , as in Proposition 2, since in this alternative story, all that is 
relevant about government financing choices is their informational content, not their raw scale. 
Proposition 3: The cross section of gap filling.   Another implication which follows 
from equation (6) is that 
2* /0 fg θ ∂∂ ∂ > .  With a little bit of liberty, this comparative static can 
be interpreted as a cross-sectional statement:  firms with stronger balance sheets (those for whom 
θ is closer to zero) will exhibit more aggressive gap-filling behavior.   
Proposition 4: The origin of corporate market timing ability.  In our model, corporate 
maturity choices forecast bond returns, so long as we are not in the limiting M-M case where θ = 
0.  This can be seen in equation (4).  In particular, when f
* is high, so that firms are tilting 
towards long-term debt, expected returns on long-term bonds are lower, and vice-versa.   
However, the ability of f
* to forecast returns in this way arises because f
* endogenously responds 
to changes in the supply g of long-term government bonds, with g being the exogenous factor 
that drives variation in expected returns. 
One implication of Proposition 4 is that we would expect the forecasting power of 
corporate maturity choices for bond returns to be diminished if we also include a measure of 
government debt maturity in the forecasting regression.  Indeed, if changes in g are the only   13
source of variation in expected returns, the two variables f
* and g are completely colinear.  More 
generally, if there are other sources of variation (e.g., shocks to target corporate maturity z, or to 
arbitrageur risk tolerance γ), then f
* may retain some incremental predictive power for bond 
returns, even controlling for g.  This is what we find in the data.
9  
 
  III.  The Maturity of Corporate and Government Debt 
In this section we describe our proxies for corporate and government debt maturity.  For 
government debt, we use the CRSP bond database. For corporate debt, we rely on two sources: 
the Federal Reserve Flow of Funds and Compustat.  Because Compustat is available starting in 
1963 and since many bond market studies (e.g., Fama and Bliss (1987), Cochrane and Piazzesi 
(2005)), start their forecasting in 1963 or 1964, we use 1963-2005 as our main period of study.
 
However, the Flow of Funds data is available earlier, and thus many of our tests can be 
replicated on a longer sample; where applicable we mention these results.
10 
 
  A.  Flow of Funds data on corporate debt maturity 
The Federal Reserve Flow of Funds tracks financial flows throughout the U.S. economy. 
As mentioned above, we follow recent research and start in 1963. We use annual data from the 
                                                 
9 In a multivariate forecasting regression for bond returns, the coefficient on f
* is negative, while that on g is 
positive.  To fully rationalize this pattern within our model, we would require shocks to at least three exogenous 
quantities: government supply g, target corporate maturity z, and some other variable which affects required returns 
(e.g. arbitrageur risk tolerance γ).  Furthermore, the shocks to z must be only weakly correlated with variation in 
expected returns; this would be the case if, for instance, the corporate sector is small relative to the government 
sector (C is small). Intuitively, if shocks to z were themselves a major driver of variation in expected returns, this 
would imply a positive coefficient on f
* in a multivariate regression, as opposed to the negative coefficient we 
observe in the data.  The details of this analysis are available on request. 
 
10 The Flow of Funds data is available as early as 1945. However, reliable estimates of government debt maturity 
based on CRSP cannot be constructed until the early 1950s. Furthermore, most studies focus on the period following 
the 1951 Fed-Treasury accord, prior to which interest rates were partially pegged. When we work with this longer 
sample, we follow BGW (2003) and begin in 1953. 
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credit market liabilities of the nonfarm, nonfinancial corporate business sector (Table L. 102). 
This sector comprises all private domestic corporations except corporate farms, S-corporations, 
and real estate management corporations. We focus on the debt maturity choices of nonfinancials 
since we expect the choices of financial institutions to be driven more by duration-matching asset 
and liability management considerations. In the words of our model, financials are likely to have 
a high value of θ, making it costly for them to deviate from their target maturity structure. 
Another reason to focus on nonfinancials is to preserve comparability with other studies.
11  
We follow BGW (2003) and define short-term corporate debt as the sum of “commercial 
paper,” “bank loans not elsewhere classified,” and “other loans and advances.” By definition, 
short-term debt retires at the end of each year.  Thus short-term debt issues ( ,
C
St d ) are the same 
thing as short-term debt outstanding ( ,
C
St D ). Throughout the paper, we follow the convention of 
level variables being denoted in upper case, and issue variables being denoted in lower case. 
Long-term corporate debt ( ,
C
Lt D ) is the sum of “industrial revenue bonds,” “corporate 
bonds,” and “mortgages.” BGW (2003) provide a detailed description of each of these items, as 
well as their shares in total long-term debt.  Our first corporate debt maturity measure, the long-
term corporate level share, is simply long-term corporate debt over total debt ( , /
CC
Lt t DD ).  As 
can be seen in the summary statistics in Table 1, the level share based on Flow of Funds data is 
quite persistent, with a first-order autocorrelation of 0.85.  
In the context of our static model, perhaps the most obvious way to test Proposition 1 
would be to simply regress the corporate level share on the analogous construct for government 
bonds.  While this is where we begin, two considerations lead us to also examine the maturity of 
                                                 
11 BGW (2003), Faulkender (2005), Faulkender and Chernenko (2007), and Butler, Grullon and Weston (2006) 
study the debt maturity policy of nonfinancial firms. Using the Compustat data, we do find that financial firms 
engage in some gap filling, albeit less than nonfinancials.  
   15
corporate issues.   First, in a more realistic dynamic setting, where adjustment costs prevent firms 
from recasting their balance sheets overnight, equilibrium involves a partial-adjustment 
mechanism, whereby it is corporate issuance that responds at the margin to the expected-return 
differentials induced by the relative stocks of long and short-term government debt.
12   Second, 
looking at issuance helps to resolve some of the econometric concerns associated with the high 
degree of persistence in the levels variable. 
Accordingly, we construct long-term debt issues ( ,
C
Lt d ) as the change in the level of long-
term corporate debt outstanding ( ,
C
L t D ), plus one-tenth the level of long-term debt in the previous 
year.  That is, we have: 
() ,, , 1 , 1 0.1
CC C C
Lt Lt Lt Lt dD D D −− =− + ×.  (7) 
This amounts to assuming that one-tenth of long-term debt matures each year. The 10-year 
maturity of long-term debt roughly corresponds to the median maturity of long-term debt issues 
in Guedes and Opler (1996). Our results are not sensitive to this assumption. 
Total corporate debt issues, 
C
t d , is the sum of long- and short-term issues. Our second 
corporate maturity measure, the long-term corporate issue share, is the ratio of long-term issues 
to total issues ( , /
CC
L tt dd ).   Not surprisingly, the issue share closely tracks the level share, with a 
time-series correlation of 0.75.  Nevertheless, the issue share is substantially less persistent, with 
a first-order autocorrelation of 0.58, compared to 0.85 for the level share.  
 
 
                                                 
12 Several recent papers emphasize the importance of adjustment costs for firms’ capital structure decisions.  See, 
e.g., Leary and Roberts (2005) and Strebulaev (2007). 
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  B.  Compustat data on corporate debt maturity 
Compustat is a second source of data for corporate debt maturity.  The advantage of the 
Compustat data is that it can be disaggregated; this makes it indispensable for our cross-sectional 
tests of Proposition 3.   However, it also has an important limitation.  Because it focuses only on 
public firms, time-variation in a Compustat-based measure of aggregate debt maturity will be 
influenced by compositional effects.
13 
Since this compositional effect is likely to be especially problematic for higher-frequency 
movements, when working with Compustat we restrict attention to a levels measure of debt 
maturity, and do not attempt to construct an issues measure. For the sake of comparability, we 
construct our Compustat levels measure to correspond as closely as possible to the Flow of 
Funds long-term level share.  Aggregating across all nonfinancial firms, we define long-term 
debt as the sum of all long-term borrowings (item 9), plus debt that was originally issued long-
term but that is about to retire (item 44).  We define short-term debt as total debt (item 9 plus 
item 34), minus long-term debt.  Our convention of counting the current portion of long-term 
debt as long-term is meant to replicate the procedure used in the Flow of Funds, whereby 
corporate bonds are classified as long-term instruments, even though some portion of these 
bonds may, at any point in time, have a short remaining duration.
14   
                                                 
13 For example, suppose that in year t there are 100 private firms with zero long-term debt, and 100 public firms (of 
the same size) with 50% long-term debt.  Suppose further that no firm alters its capital structure in year t+1 (so that 
a Flow of Funds type measure remains constant) but that 10 of the private firms go public.  The measured long-term 
debt share based on public-firm data would drop from 50% to 50/110 = 45%.  According to Fama and French 
(2004), between 1980 and 2001, an average of 10% of public firms were new lists in a given year.  So compositional 
effects of this sort have the potential to be quantitatively significant. 
 
14 As noted by BGW (2003), one would ideally like data on floating rate features and callability. Call provisions, for 
example, reduce the effective maturity of long-term issues. BGW show that corporate debt maturity measures 
adjusted for callability and floating rate exposure are generally stronger forecasters of bond returns than the 
unadjusted measures. Thus the Flow of Funds long-term share and the Compustat long-term share should be thought 
of as somewhat coarse measures of corporate debt maturity. 
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Over the 1963-2005 period, the Compustat long-term level share is generally higher than 
the corresponding Flow of Funds series; the means of the two series are 83.4% and 61.5% 
respectively.  We suspect that this is because Compustat firms, which are public, have better 
access to longer-term financing instruments—an observation which reinforces the above concern 
about compositional effects.  At an annual frequency, the two variables have a correlation of 
0.41.  This correlation is generally higher later in the sample period, and higher still if one nets 
out a time trend in the Compustat measure. 
 
  C.  CRSP data on government debt maturity 
The available data on government bonds allows for a much finer characterization of debt 
maturity structure than we are able to obtain for firms. Nevertheless, we stick with a simple 
measure that matches our corporate maturity variable: the fraction of government debt with a 
maturity of one year or more, hereafter the long-term government level share.  
To construct the long-term government share, we follow Greenwood and Vayanos 
(2008). The CRSP U.S. Treasury Database reports detailed information on every Treasury 
security that was outstanding between 1925 and 2006.  For each security, CRSP reports a 
number of characteristics, including the issue date, final maturity, and callability features. CRSP 
also provides monthly readings of the dollar face value of each instrument. Changes in face value 
reflect repurchases, as well as follow-on offerings (a.k.a. “re-openings”) of an existing issue. 
We decompose the payment stream of each outstanding issue into a series of principal 
and coupon repayments.  In each month, these series are adjusted for variation in the face value 
outstanding. Every month, we aggregate payments due in the subsequent n periods, across all   18
issues that are still outstanding.  The government long-term share ( , /
GG
Lt t DD ) is then defined as 
total payments due in more than one year, divided by total payments in all future periods.
15   
To ensure robustness, we also rerun some of our basic specifications with a second 
measure of government debt maturity: the dollar-weighted average maturity of principal 
payments, which we denote by M.  As can be seen in Table 1, both of these variables are highly 
persistent, with first-order autocorrelations on the order of 0.95. 
 
  D.  Other variables 
Our tests below use several other variables, also summarized in Table 1: the short-term 
(one-year) Treasury yield ySt; the spread between the long-term (20-year) Treasury yield and the 
short-term yield, (yLt – ySt); the one-year excess log return on long-term Treasuries, (RLt+1 – ySt); 
the credit spread, defined as the Moody’s Baa yield minus the yield on long-term Treasuries; the 
ratio of government debt to GDP; the ratio of government debt to total credit market liabilities; 
annual GDP growth, (ΔLog(GDP)); and a recession dummy based on NBER dating conventions. 
 
  IV.  Proposition 1: Gap Filling 
  A.  Univariate tests 
The primary prediction of our theory, Proposition 1, is that when the government 
lengthens the maturity profile of its debt, firms respond by doing the opposite.  Panels A-C  of 
Figure 1 present a first look at this prediction.  In Panel A, we plot the Flow of Funds long-term 
corporate level share against one minus the government long-term share; given this transform of 
the government share variable, our hypothesis is that the two series in the figure should be 
                                                 
15 This series has a correlation of 0.91 with the variable used by Greenwood and Vayanos (2008), namely the share 
of government payments due in more than 10 years. The one-year share also has a correlation of 0.95 with a simpler 
measure of government maturity which just counts the fraction of outstanding principal due in more than one year.    19
positively correlated.  In Panels B and C, we replace the Flow of Funds level share with the Flow 
of Funds issue share and the Compustat level share, respectively.  In all three cases, the 
correlation between corporate and government debt maturity is readily apparent. 
  Table 2 presents a set of univariate OLS regressions corresponding to Figure 1. We 
regress each of our three measures of corporate debt maturity one at a time against either: i) the 
government long-term share; or ii) the weighted maturity M of government debt. In these 
regressions, we do not invert the government variables, so we expect to see negative correlations.  
Since all of the underlying series are persistent, we report Newey-West (1987) standard errors 
which are robust to serial correlation at up to two lags.    
  In all six regressions, we obtain the predicted negative coefficients.  The results for both 
the  Flow of Funds level share and the Flow of Funds issue share are strongly statistically 
significant, with t-statistics ranging from 2.64 to 4.21.   The results for the Compustat level share 
are statistically marginal, with t-stats of 1.83 and 1.67. 
In terms of economic magnitudes, the regression coefficients in the first and third 
columns of Table 2 (-0.262 and -0.249) imply that when the fraction of U.S. Treasury debt 
longer than one year rises by 10%, the long-term corporate share based on Flow of Funds falls by 
about 2.5%; this holds in both levels and issues. To understand what this means for total gap 
filling, we can multiply this by the average ratio of corporate debt to government debt during the 
sample period of 1.09, yielding 2.7% percent. This suggests that, on a dollar-for-dollar basis, 
firms fill 27% of the gap created by variation in government debt maturity. 
 
  B.  Multivariate tests 
  In Table 3, we take the univariate regressions from Table 2, and add a set of further 
controls: i) the short-term Treasury yield ySt; ii) the term spread (yLt – ySt); and iii) a linear time   20
trend.   As noted in the Introduction, several studies have documented a link between corporate 
debt maturity and “market conditions” proxies like ySt and (yLt – ySt), and we want to make sure 
that our univariate inferences are not distorted by the omission of these variables. 
  As can be seen in the table, the addition of these controls makes the coefficient on 
government debt maturity stronger and more statistically significant in all cases.  For example, in 
the regression of the Flow of Funds level share against the government level share, the 
coefficient is -0.387 (t-stat of 5.45) with the full set of controls—implying that firms fill 42% of 
any government-induced supply gaps in dollar terms—as compared to its value of -0.262 (t-stat 
of 3.64) in the univariate specification.  In the regression of the Compustat level share against the 
government share, the coefficient is -0.228 (t-stat of 2.33) with the full set of controls, as 
compared to its value of -0.147 (t-stat of 1.83) in the univariate case.   
  This pattern should not be too surprising.  It seems plausible that both firms and the 
government might respond to certain market conditions in the same manner.  For example, one 
might expect both to tilt their borrowing to the short end of the maturity spectrum when the term 
spread is high, in an effort to reduce reported interest expenses.  This would tend to induce an 
element of positive correlation between the corporate share and the government share, 
dampening the negative relationship created by the mechanism in our model.  In this scenario, 
controlling for the term spread makes the predicted negative correlation emerge more clearly. 
  
  C.  Robustness 
Table 4 presents a number of robustness checks on the multivariate results of Table 3.   
There are three columns, corresponding to our three measures of corporate debt maturity.  In the 
first row, we reproduce our baseline estimates from Table 3, using the government level share as 
the key explanatory variable, and including the full set of controls.  (These baseline estimates   21
correspond to columns (2), (6) and (10) of Table 3.)   In the second and third rows, we display 
subsample estimates.  As can be seen, the results are generally stronger, both economically and 
statistically, in the second half of the sample, which runs from 1984-2005. The differences across 
sample periods are relatively modest with the two Flow of Funds measures of corporate debt 
maturity, but are striking with the Compustat measure; in this case the point estimate is very 
large and significant in the post-1984 period, (-0.787, with a t-stat of 11.68) but actually goes the 
wrong way in the first half of the sample.  We suspect that this divergence may have something 
to do with the fact that Compustat offers less complete coverage of the entire (public plus 
private) universe during the earlier period.  
In the fourth row of Table 4, we extend the sample for the Flow of Funds measures 
further back in time, so that it covers 1953-2005.  (Again, we are unable to go back further than 
1963 with the Compustat data.)  The results are qualitatively similar to those from our baseline 
sample period of 1963-2005, albeit a bit smaller in absolute magnitude.   
In the fifth through ninth rows of Table 4, we add a number of further controls for general 
economic and credit-market conditions.  The motivation is that some firms may find it difficult 
to issue long-term debt during periods of weak economic growth, or when credit spreads are 
high. In the fifth row, we add an NBER recession dummy to our baseline specification.  In the 
sixth row, we add two leads and two lags of this recession dummy to the previous regression.  In 
the seventh row, we control for leads and lags of GDP growth.  In the eighth row, we control for 
the credit spread, defined as the Moody’s Baa yield minus the average yield on long-term 
Treasuries.
16  In all cases, our results are either similar to those from the baseline specification, 
or somewhat stronger. 
                                                 
16 Estrella and Mishkin (1998), Harvey (1989), and Stock and Watson (1989) discuss the role of yield spreads and 
credit spreads in forecasting economic growth.     22
In the ninth row, we replace the government share with an alternative proxy, namely the 
fraction of government debt due in more than 10 years.  This too leads to similar results, though 
in this case the point estimates cannot be compared directly to those in previous specifications 
because we are now working with a different explanatory variable. 
 
D.  What drives government debt maturity? 
A general concern for our results thus far is that we have been taking government debt 
maturity to be exogenous, without a clearly articulated theory of what causes it to move around.  
This leaves open the possibility that both government and corporate maturity are simply 
responding (albeit in opposite directions) to some unspecified factor that we have failed to 
include in our list of controls.  If we had a good theory of government debt maturity, this might 
suggest an instrument that would allow us to address this possibility head on. 
Empirically, a powerful determinant of the government long-term debt share is the ratio 
of government debt to GDP: in our sample period, a univariate regression of the former on the 
latter yields an R-squared of 0.74.  In other words, when the government’s financing needs are 
greater, it tends to extend its offerings out to longer maturities.  This relationship has led 
Greenwood and Vayanos (2008) to use the debt-to-GDP ratio as an instrument for government 
maturity in a setting similar to ours, and we follow this approach below.  Before doing so, 
however, it is useful to pause and ask why one might expect to see such a strong empirical 
connection between government debt maturity and the debt-to-GDP ratio; as far as we know, this 
connection is not clearly predicted by any existing formal theory.
17 
                                                 
17 For theories of optimal government debt maturity see, e.g., Roley (1979), Barro (1995), Angeletos (2002), and 
Guibaud, Nosbusch, and Vayanos (2007). 
   23
One informal hypothesis goes as follows.  On the one hand, there is a perceived cost 
advantage to the government in financing short-term; this allows it to economize on the 
historically positive term premium.  On the other hand, short-term financing requires more 
frequent rollovers.  As the size of the government’s debt increases, so too do the risks associated 
with larger and more frequent refinancings—e.g., the possibility that a temporary dislocation in 
markets causes unexpectedly low investor turnout at an auction.   An aversion to such risks 
would lead the government to extend its maturities as the stock of its debt goes up.   
 Former Treasury secretary Lawrence Summers describes government financing behavior 
along just these lines: “I think the right theory is that one tries to [borrow] short to save money 
but not [so much as] to be imprudent with respect to rollover risk.   Hence there is certain 
tolerance for [short term] debt but marginal debt once [total] debt goes up has to be more long 
term.”
18  If this account is on target, using the debt-to-GDP ratio as an instrument for government 
debt maturity would appear to be a well-motivated exercise, grounded in a specific model of 
government financing policy.    
Accordingly, in the tenth row of Table 4, we return to the baseline specification of the 
first row, but estimate the regression by instrumental variables (IV), instead of by OLS.  As can 
be seen, this produces estimates that are very close to those from the corresponding OLS 
specifications.  For example, with the Flow of Funds level share as the dependent variable, IV 
yields a point estimate of -0.395 (t-stat of 4.89), as compared to the OLS estimate of -0.387.  
One remaining question for the IV approach is whether our instrument, the debt-to-GDP 
ratio, satisfies the exclusion restriction.  For example, one might worry that high values of the 
                                                 
18 Private email correspondence, April 28, 2008.  Also relevant is Garbade (2007), who emphasizes the Treasury’s 
desire to minimize the uncertainties associated with the auction process.  He notes that after 1975, Treasury officials 
explicitly renounced the concept of “tactical issuance” and replaced it with a policy of “regular and predictable” note 
and bond offerings. According to Garbade, “the move to regular and predictable issuance was widely credited with 
reducing market uncertainty, facilitating investor planning and lowering the Treasury’s borrowing costs.” 
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debt-to-GDP ratio are associated with adverse credit-market conditions, and hence influence 
corporate debt maturity through another channel.
19  In an effort to address this issue, we run an 
augmented version of the IV specification that adds a control for the credit spread.  The results, 
shown in the eleventh row of Table 4, are actually somewhat stronger than those without the 
credit-spread control.    
 
E.  Differenced and GLS specifications 
  As emphasized above, our measures of corporate and government debt maturity are 
highly persistent.  One way to address this persistence is to simply compute adjusted standard 
errors that take it into account, as we have been doing throughout.  Alternatively, the classic 
prescriptions for persistence are either to estimate the regression in first differences, or to use a 
generalized-least-squares (GLS) estimator.  We try both of these techniques below.  In each case, 
however, we have to be mindful of the risk of over-differencing.  Specifically, in a world where 
issuance costs and other frictions create lags in the adjustment process, it might be unrealistic to 
expect an innovation in government debt maturity in year t to be met with the full response of 
corporate debt maturity in the same year t—rather, it might take a few years for the adjustment 
process to play itself all the way out. 
In the left-most panel of Table 5, we use the Flow of Funds issue share to estimate 
specifications of the form: 
() ,, //
CC G G
Lt t k Lt t t dda b DD u =+⋅ Δ +,         ( 8 )  
                                                 
19 Our baseline IV specification already controls for the level of short-term interest rates and the yield spread, which 
might plausibly be related to the debt to GDP ratio.  We only require that our instrument be orthogonal to any 
omitted factors that affect corporate debt maturities. 
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where  () , /
GG
kL tt DD Δ  represents the cumulative change in the government long-term debt share 
variable over the past k years, for k=1,2,3,4, and 5.  Thus these specifications explore how 
corporate issues respond not to the level of the government share, but instead to recent changes 
in the government share.  This is one simple approach to differencing.  When the differencing 
window is only one year, the results are statistically weaker than when the government share is 
entered in levels form.  However, as we broaden the differencing window out to two years and 
beyond, the results again become strongly significant.  By the time the window reaches five 
years, the estimated value of b is -0.289, with a t-statistic of 4.63. Thus while the response of 
corporate issues to changes in government debt maturity is not entirely contemporaneous, it 
appears that our earlier results reflect something more than the juxtaposition of very low-
frequency trends in the two series. 
In the second and third panels of Table 5, we alternately use the Flow of Funds and 
Compustat level shares to estimate specifications of the form: 
() ( ) ,, //
CG G
kL tt kL tt t DDa b DD u Δ= + ⋅ Δ + .        ( 9 )  
This is just a differenced version of our baseline levels specification, with the differencing 
window again varying from one to five years.  For the Flow of Funds level share the results are 
statistically weak when using a one-year window, but grow progressively stronger as the window 
is widened.  With a five-year window, the estimate of b is -0.325, with a t-statistic of 2.18.  By 
contrast, the results for the Compustat level share are of roughly similar significance for all 
values of k. 
  In untabulated regressions, we have also explored the lead-lag properties of the 
relationship between government and corporate maturities.  Specifically, in bivariate vector 
autoregressions we find a negative and significant relationship between the current corporate   26
issue share (or changes in the corporate level share) and lagged changes in the government level 
share.  However, there is no significant relationship between current changes in the government 
level share and the lagged corporate issue share.  That is, changes in government maturities 
appear to Granger-cause changes in corporate maturities.  This lead-lag asymmetry further 
alleviates possible concerns about reverse causation. 
In Table 6 we report GLS estimates of the univariate and multivariate specifications from 
Tables 2 and 3.
20  The middle panel presents results for the Flow of Funds issue share.  These 
results are almost identical to those obtained using OLS.  For example, with the full set of 
controls, we obtain a GLS estimate of -0.316 for the coefficient on the government share, with a 
t-statistic of 6.16; this compares with an OLS estimate of -0.318 (t-stat of 5.77) for the 
corresponding regression in Table 3.  Thus for the Flow of Funds issue variable, our results are 
entirely robust to using GLS. 
The GLS procedure makes less sense when using the Flow of Funds level share.  This is 
illustrated in the left-hand panel of Table 6.  As can be seen, the high persistence of the levels 
variable leads to an estimated value of ρ on the order of 0.96 in the GLS procedure.  Hence in 
this case, GLS is essentially identical to first-differencing the data.  And as seen in Table 5, 
running the Flow of Funds levels regressions in first differences leads to insignificant results, for 
the reasons developed above.  Given that ρ is estimated to be almost one, the GLS results for 
Flow of Funds levels in Table 6 amount to no more than a restatement of this prior finding.  Note 
that GLS is not redundant in the same way when the dependent variable is the Flow of Funds 
                                                 
20 The GLS regressions are estimated using the iterated Prais-Winsten (1954) procedure. Relative to Cochrane-
Orcutt (1949), the Prais-Winsten procedure does not throw out the first observation in the sample and is therefore 
the true MLE estimator under the assumption that the residuals follow an AR(1) process. However, we obtain 
virtually identical results if we do throw out the first observation and use the Cochrane-Orcutt instead. 
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issue share; in this case, the estimated value of ρ ranges from 0.05 to 0.43, so GLS is quite 
distinct from first differences.  
Finally, the GLS results for the Compustat level share, shown in the right-hand panel of 
Table 6, represent an intermediate case between those for the two Flow of Funds variables. In 
this specification, we estimate ρ to be 0.80, so that while there is a good deal of persistence, GLS 
is not literally the same thing as first-differencing the data.  And as can be seen, the GLS results 
for the Compustat level share look very similar, in both magnitude and statistical significance, to 
their OLS counterparts in Tables 2 and 3. 
 
  V.  Proposition 2: Time-Variation in Gap Filling 
  Our model predicts that when government debt supply is large, gap filling by firms will 
be quantitatively stronger.  To test this hypothesis, we consider two proxies for the size of the 
government bond market.  The first is the ratio of government debt to GDP, and the second is the 
ratio of government debt to total credit market debt; these two variables are plotted in Figure 2.
21   
In each case, we use the Flow of Funds long-term corporate issue share as our dependent 
variable, and run the following regression: 






C C GG GG
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′ ⋅+ ⋅ × ++ θ x
    (10) 
where  t Scale  denotes one of our two measures of the size of the government bond market, time 
is a linear trend, and  t x is a set of controls for debt market conditions (yield spread and the short-
term bond yield).  The coefficient of interest, d, is that on the interaction between  t Scale  and 
                                                 
21 In addition to Treasury securities, total credit market debt includes open market paper, GSE debt and GSE-backed 
securities (mortgage backed securities), municipal securities, corporate and foreign bonds, bank loans, other loans 
and advances, and consumer credit.   28
government debt maturity.  If, as predicted in Proposition 2, gap filling is stronger when  t Scale  
is high, then we should find d < 0. 
  Note that this specification also allows for an interaction between a time trend and 
government debt maturity.  Thus we are asking whether there is an independent effect of  t Scale  
on gap filling behavior, above and beyond the existence of a simple time trend in the intensity of 
gap filling.  This relatively stringent test is motivated by an earlier observation from Table 4, 
namely that gap filling appears to be more pronounced in the latter half of our sample period.  
  The results of these regressions are shown in Table 7.  There are four columns, 
corresponding to the two measures of the size of the government bond market, and to versions of 
(10) with and without the further controls ySt and (yLt – ySt).  In each of the four cases, the key 
coefficient d is estimated to be negative, as predicted.  The results are statistically significant in 
the first, third, and fourth columns, and marginally significant (t-stat of 1.77) in the second.  
Thus the evidence is generally supportive of Proposition 2.
22   
 
  VI.  Proposition 3:  The Cross-Section of Gap Filling 
The model also predicts that gap-filling behavior should be more pronounced among 
those firms for whom the costs of deviating from the optimal debt maturity structure is smaller.  
To test this proposition, we use the Compustat data to create disaggregated versions of the long-
term corporate level share for various subsamples of firms.  We can then ask whether this share 
responds more sensitively to the long-term government share among firms that appear to have 
more financial flexibility.    
                                                 
22 The full effect of a one percentage-point increase in the government long-term share is given by 
t b d Scale f time +⋅ +⋅ , which explains why  0 b >  in Table 7.     29
We use six proxies for financial flexibility.  The first is simply a firm’s market 
capitalization.  The other five are motivated by the work of Kaplan and Zingales (1997), who 
show that the following firm-level characteristics are associated with a lessening of financial 
constraints: high dividends; high cashflow to assets; high cash balances to assets; low Tobin’s Q; 
and low book leverage.  For all of the variables except dividends, we assign each year those 
nonfinancial firms below the 30
th percentile to the “low” category, and those above the 70
th 
percentile to the “high” category.  For dividends, we simply separate the payers and the non-
payers.   Again, our predictions are that the coefficient on the government share should be more 
strongly negative—i.e., there should be more gap filling—for firms that rank “high” in terms of 
market cap, cashflow and cash balances, for firms that rank “low” in terms of Q and leverage, 
and for firms that are dividend payers. 
Table 8 reports the results of these tests.  The baseline specification is, but for the 
disaggregation, identical to that in column (10) of Table 3, including as additional controls ySt, 
(yLt – ySt), and a time trend.  The first row of Table 8 just repeats the coefficient estimate on the 
government long-term share from the full Compustat nonfinancial sample: -0.228, with a t-
statistic of 2.33. 
In the second row, we see that the coefficient for large firms is -0.286, while that for 
small firms is 0.024; the t-stat on the difference between these two coefficients is 2.18. These 
findings with respect to market cap echo the survey results of Graham and Harvey (2001): 
managers of larger firms are more likely to say that they attempt to time movements in Treasury 
rates.  Similarly, the third row shows that the coefficient for dividend payers is -0.263, while that 
for non-payers is -0.043, with a t-stat on the difference of 1.91.  These two sample splits are 
illustrated in Panels A and B of Figure 3.   30
The fourth and fifth rows document that firms with high cashflows and cash balances also 
have more negative coefficients on the government long-term share, though only the former 
comparison is statistically significant (t-stats of 1.94 and 1.07 respectively). The sixth row shows 
that low-Q firms have a coefficient of -0.318, while high-Q firms have a coefficient of -0.063, 
with a t-stat on the difference of 1.97.  Thus for five characteristics—size, dividends, cashflow, 
cash balances, and Q—each of the subsample comparisons go in the direction predicted by the 
theory, albeit not significantly in the case of cash balances. 
The one sample split that yields no meaningful differential is book leverage: the 
coefficients for high and low leverage firms are almost the same, at -0.367 and -0.375 
respectively.   One possible explanation for this non-result is that, by definition, high-leverage 
firms enjoy greater dollar benefits from timing the debt market.  Hence if there are any fixed 
costs associated with having an activist debt-management policy, high-leverage firms will be 
more inclined to bear this fixed cost, and thus to engage in gap filling.  This would create an 
effect that runs counter to the financial-flexibility effect envisioned in our model. 
Nevertheless, the overall picture that emerges from Table 8 is that, according to most 
measures, it does appear that increased flexibility is associated with more aggressive gap filling.  
Thus the evidence is largely—though not entirely—consistent with Proposition 3.
23 
 
  VII.  Proposition 4: Gap Filling and Excess Bond Returns 
Our final analysis, in Table 9, examines the predictability of excess returns in the 
Treasury bond market. Here we use a longer sample period of 1953-2005 to allow for 
comparison with the bond market predictability results in BGW (2003), Butler, Grullon and 
                                                 
23 While we have interpreted our results as reflecting differences in debt supply elasticities across firms, these 
findings would also be consistent with the idea that investors view the debt of corporations with strong balance 
sheets as a closer substitute for government debt than that of financially constrained firms.   31
Weston (2006), and Greenwood and Vayanos (2008).  There are three blocks in the table, 
corresponding to one-year-ahead, two-year-ahead, and three-year-ahead excess returns.  The first 
column in each block reproduces the baseline findings of Greenwood and Vayanos (2008), using 
the long-term government share to forecast returns.  In these univariate regressions, the 
government share emerges as a statistically significant predictor at all three horizons.  In 
particular, when government debt maturity is high, subsequent returns on long-term bonds are 
high as well—hence the motive for firms to fill the gap by using relatively cheaper short-term 
debt.  The magnitudes are also economically interesting: when the government share goes up by 
one percentage point, excess bond returns rise by 22.5 basis points, 52.3 basis points, and 82.4 
basis points at the one, two and three-year horizons respectively. 
The second and fourth columns of each block present univariate regressions similar to 
those in BGW (2003).  The long-term corporate level share and the long-term corporate issue 
share (both based on Flow of Funds data) are used one at a time to forecast excess returns.   Both 
variables have significant predictive power at the two and three-year horizons, though with the 
opposite sign as the government long-term share.  It should be noted that while the qualitative 
picture is similar to that in BGW, the statistical significance of our results is somewhat weaker 
than those reported by BGW for the 1953-2000 period; this divergence is caused by the year 
2001, when both corporate debt maturity and excess bond returns were high.  
The above results are not new.  However, our theory does make the following novel 
prediction, embodied in Proposition 4: to the extent that corporate debt maturity predicts bond 
returns, some of this predictability arises simply because corporate debt maturity serves as a 
mirror of government debt maturity, and hence of the supply shocks that are the ultimate driver 
of returns.  Thus once government maturity is included in the regression, the predictive power of 
corporate maturity—measured in either levels or in issues—should be diminished.  These   32
bivariate horse races are shown in the third and fifth columns of each block.  And as can be seen, 
they provide consistent support for this aspect of our theory.  Consider for example the case 
where the long-term corporate issue share is used to forecast three-year ahead excess returns.  
When used as a univariate predictor, this variable attracts a coefficient of -1.588, with a t-statistic 
of 2.64.  However, when it is entered with the long-term government share, the coefficient falls 
to -1.045, with a t-stat of -1.52—i.e., it shrinks by about one-third of its original value.   
 
VIII.  Conclusions 
The survey evidence in Graham and Harvey (2001) suggests that at least some of the 
time-series variation in corporate debt maturity reflects an active effort by managers to time the 
debt market, i.e., to issue at the cheapest point on the yield curve.  Such attempts at market 
timing are difficult to understand if one thinks in terms of access to information, or forecasting 
capabilities: it is hard to see why the managers of nonfinancial firms should have any 
comparative advantage—relative to say, hedge-fund managers—at predicting future bond-
market excess returns. 
This paper has argued that debt-market timing by firms makes more sense when viewed 
through the lens of liquidity provision.  Even if operating firms have access to the same 
information as hedge funds, and hence make the same forecasts of excess returns, they do bring 
to the table significant additional risk absorption capacity.  This extra capacity is of particular 
value when movements in excess returns are driven by quantitatively large and undiversifiable 
supply shocks, as is the case in the Treasury bond market. 
A similar logic can be used to think about other forms of market timing.  For example, it 
has been documented that firms exhibit timing behavior with respect to both the firm-specific 
and aggregate components of stock prices, issuing more equity when prices are high and   33
expected returns are low on either of these dimensions.
24  While a theory based on private 
information may shed light on how individual firms manage to issue equity in advance of low 
idiosyncratic returns, this approach is less well-suited to explaining why high values of aggregate 
equity issuance forecast low market-wide returns, as in Baker and Wurgler (2000).   We suspect 
that here too, thinking about firms as macro liquidity providers, rather than as especially well-
informed stock-market forecasters, is likely to be fruitful.  A clean illustration of this point 
comes from the stock-market crash of 1987.  In the wake of the crash, many firms announced 
repurchase programs.  Given that they were responding to an event about which there was 
common knowledge, it is hard to believe that these firms had any kind of informational edge 
over other market participants.  However, given the stresses on arbitrage capital caused by the 
crash, it seems likely that operating firms, especially those with strong balance sheets, were 
advantaged in terms of risk absorption capacity. 
The hypothesis that firms behave as activist macro arbitrageurs may strike many as being 
far from the dictates of textbook corporate-finance theory, which is often interpreted as saying 
that, absent adjustment costs, firms should stick close to an optimally-chosen target capital 
structure.  However, it should be emphasized that our theory is based on the single most 
fundamental concept in corporate finance, namely the Modigliani-Miller (1958) irrelevance 
proposition. To the extent that M-M provides an accurate description of reality—i.e., to the 
extent that firms are otherwise approximately indifferent to variations in capital structure in the 
neighborhood of their target optima—their comparative advantage over other capital-market 
players in the realm of macro arbitrage is all the more pronounced.     
                                                 
24 See e.g., Loughran and Ritter (1995), and Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1995) for evidence at the firm 
level, and Baker and Wurgler (2000) and Lamont and Stein (2006) for evidence at the market level. 
   34
References 
Angeletos, George-Marios, 2002, Fiscal policy with non-contingent debt and the optimal 
maturity structure, Quarterly Journal of Economics 117, 1105-1131. 
Baker, Malcolm, Robin Greenwood, and Jeffrey Wurgler, 2003, The maturity of debt issues and 
predictable variation in bond returns, Journal of Financial Economics 70, 261-291. 
Baker, Malcolm, and Jeffrey Wurgler, 2000, The equity share in new issues and aggregate stock 
returns, Journal of Finance 55, 2219-2257. 
Barclay, Michael J., and Clifford W. Smith Jr., 1995, The maturity structure of corporate debt, 
Journal of Finance 50, 609-631. 
Barro, Robert J., 1995, Optimal debt management, NBER Working Paper 5327. 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, various issues. Flow of Funds Accounts of 
the United States: Flows and Outstandings. 
Bosworth, Barry, 1971, Patterns of corporate external financing, Brookings Papers on Economic 
Activity 2, 253-284. 
Butler, Alexander W., Gustavo Grullon, and James P. Weston, 2006, Can managers successfully 
time the maturity structure of their debt?, Journal of Finance 61, 1731-1758. 
Chernenko, Sergey, and Michael Faulkender, 2007, Interest rate swap speculation and 
managerial compensation, Washington University Working paper. 
Cochrane D., and G.H. Orcutt, 1949, Application of least squares regression to relationships 
containing autocorrelated error terms, Journal of American Statistical Association 44, 32-
61. 
Cochrane, John H. and Monika Piazzesi, 2005, Bond risk premia, American Economic Review 
95:138-160. 
Diamond, Douglas W., 1991, Debt maturity structure and liquidity risk, Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 106, 709-737. 
Estrella, Arturo, and Frederic S. Mishkin, 1998, Predicting U.S. recessions: Financial variables 
as leading indicators, Review of Economics and Statistics 80, 45-61. 
Fama, Eugene F. and Robert R. Bliss, 1987, The information in long-maturity forward rates, 
American Economic Review 77, 680-692. 
Fama, Eugene F. and Kenneth R. French, 2004, New lists: fundamentals and survival rates, 
Journal of Financial Economics 73, 229-269. 
Faulkender, Michael, 2005, Hedging or market timing? Selecting the interest rate exposure of 
corporate debt, Journal of Finance 60, 931-962.   35
Flannery, Mark J., 1986, Asymmetric information and risky debt maturity choice, Journal of 
Finance 41, 19-37. 
Garbade, Kenneth D., 2007, The emergence of “regular and predictable” as a Treasury debt 
management strategy, FRBNY Economic Policy Review, 53-71. 
Graham, John R., and Campbell R. Harvey, 2001, The theory and practice of corporate finance: 
evidence from the field, Journal of Financial Economics 60, 187-243. 
Greenwood, Robin, and Dimitri Vayanos, 2008, Bond supply and excess bond returns, NBER 
Working Paper 13806. 
Guedes, Jose, and Tim Opler, 1996, The determinants of the maturity of corporate debt issues, 
Journal of Finance 51, 1809-1833. 
Guibaud, Stephane, Yves Nosbusch, and Dimitri Vayanos, 2007, Preferred habitat and the 
optimal maturity structure of government debt, London School of Economics Working 
Paper. 
Harvey, Campbell R., 1989, Forecasts of economic growth from the bond and stock markets, 
Financial Analysts Journal 45(5): 38–45. 
Hart, Oliver and John Moore, 1995, Debt and seniority: An analysis of the role of hard claims in 
constraining management, American Economic Review 85, 567-585. 
Hong, Harrison, Jiang Wang, and Jialin Yu, 2008, Firms as buyers of last resort, Journal of 
Financial Economics, forthcoming. 
Ikenberry, David, Josef Lakonishok, and Theo Vermaelen, 1995, Market underreaction to open 
market share repurchases, Journal of Financial Economics 39, 181–208. 
Kaplan, Steven N., and Luigi Zingales, 1997, Do investment-cash flow sensitivities provide 
useful measures of financing constraints?, Quarterly Journal of Economics 112, 169-215. 
Krishnamurthy, Arvind and Annette Vissing-Jorgensen, 2008, The aggregate demand for 
treasury debt, Northwestern University Working Paper. 
Lamont, Owen A. and Jeremy C. Stein, 2006, Investor sentiment and corporate finance: micro 
and macro, American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 96, 147-151. 
Leary, Mark T. and Michael R. Roberts, 2005, Do firms rebalance their capital structures?, 
Journal of Finance 60, 2575-2620. 
Loughran, Tim, and Jay Ritter, 1995, The new issues puzzle, Journal of Finance 50, 23–51. 
Marsh, Paul, 1982, The choice between equity and debt: an empirical study, Journal of Finance 
37, 121-144.   36
Modigliani, Franco, and Merton H. Miller, 1958, The cost of capital, corporation finance, and the 
theory of investment,  American Economic Review 48, 261-297. 
Modigliani, Franco, and Richard Sutch, 1966a, Debt management and the term structure of 
interest rates: an empirical analysis of recent experience, Journal of Political Economy 
75, 569-589. 
Modigliani, Franco, and Richard Sutch, 1966b, Innovations in interest rate policy, American 
Economic Review 56, 178-197. 
Myers, Stewart C., 1977, Determinants of corporate borrowing, Journal of Financial Economics 
5, 147-175. 
Newey, Whitney K. and Kenneth D. West, 1987, A simple, positive semi-definite, 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent covariance matrix, Econometrica, 55, 
703-708. 
Prais, S.J., and C.B. Winsten, 1954, Trend estimators and serial correlation, Cowles Commission 
Discussion Paper No. 383, University of Chicago. 
Roley, V. Vance, 1979, A theory of federal debt management, American Economic Review 69, 
915-926. 
Shleifer, Andrei and Robert Vishny, 1997, The limits of arbitrage, Journal of Finance 52, 35-55. 
Stein, Jeremy C., 1989, Efficient capital markets, inefficient firms: A model of myopic corporate 
behavior, Quarterly Journal of Economics 104, 655-669. 
Stein, Jeremy C., 1996, Rational capital budgeting in an irrational world, Journal of Business 69, 
429-455. 
Stein, Jeremy C., 2005, Why are most funds open end? Competition and the limits of arbitrage, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 120, 247-272. 
Stock, James, and Mark Watson, 1989, New indexes of coincident and leading indicators, in 
Olivier Blanchard and Stanley Fischer (eds.), NBER Macroeconomic Annual 4, 351-394. 
Strebulaev, Ilya A., 2007, Do tests of capital structure theory mean what they say? Journal of 
Finance 62, 1747-1787. 
Stohs, Mark Hoven, and David C. Mauer, 1996, The determinants of corporate debt maturity 
structure, Journal of Business 69, 279-312. 
Taggart Jr., Robert A., 1977, A model of corporate financing decisions, Journal of Finance 32, 
1467-1484. 
Vayanos, Dimitri, and Jean-Luc Vila, 2007, A preferred-habitat model of the term structure of 
interest rates, London School of Economics Working Paper.   37
Figure 1. Corporate and government debt maturity, 1963-2005. The dashed line, plotted on the left axis, is the 
share of long-term corporate debt as a fraction of total debt. The solid line, plotted on the right axis, is the share of 
government debt with maturity of one year or less. Panel A shows the corporate long-term level share based on Flow 
of Funds data.  Panel B shows the corporate long-term issue share based on Flow of Funds data. Panel C shows the 
corporate long-term level share based on Compustat data. 
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Figure 2. Debt market size, 1963-2005. The dashed line shows the ratio of government debt to GDP. The solid line 
shows the ratio of government debt to total credit market debt. Total outstanding Treasury securities and total credit 
market debt are from Table L.4 of the Flow of Funds. In addition to Treasury securities, credit market debt includes 
open market paper, GSE debt and GSE-backed securities, municipal securities, corporate and foreign bonds, bank 
loans (n.e.c.), other loans and advances, mortgages, and consumer credit. Data on nominal GDP is from the Bureau 
of Economic Analysis. 
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Figure 3. Long-term debt share, Compustat splits, 1963-2005. The solid line, plotted on the right axis, is the 
share of government debt with maturity of one year or less. In Panel A, the dashed and hatched lines plot the long-
term corporate share for large capitalization and small capitalization firms, respectively. In Panel B, the dashed and 
hatched lines plot the long-term corporate share for dividend payers and non-payers, respectively.  
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Table 1. Summary statistics. Means, medians, standard deviations, extreme values, and autocorrelations of 
variables between 1963 and 2005. Panel A shows the corporate long-term level share, and the corporate long-term 
issue share, based on Flow of Funds (FOF) data. FOF long-term debt includes industrial revenue bonds, corporate 
bonds, and mortgages. FOF total debt also includes commercial paper, bank loans not elsewhere classified, and 
other short-term loans and advances.  All FOF short-term debt is assumed to be new short-term issues. FOF long-
term issues are defined as the change in FOF long-term debt plus one-tenth of lagged FOF long-term debt. Panel B 
shows the corresponding levels measure from Compustat. Compustat debt is the sum of long-term debt (Item 9) and 
debt in current liabilities (Item 34). Long-term debt is the sum of all long-term borrowings (item 9), plus debt that 
was originally issued long-term but that is about to retire (item 44). Panel C summarizes measures of public debt 
maturity, estimated using the CRSP government bond database. The first measure,  /
G
L
G D D , denotes the fraction of 
principal and coupon payments that are due in more than one year. The second measure, M, denotes the face-value 
weighted maturity of government bonds. Panel D summarizes interest rate conditions: ySt is the log yield on one-year 
Treasuries, yLt – ySt is the spread between the log yields of the 20-year Treasury bond and the one-year Treasury 
bond, RLt+1 – ySt is the log one-year forward excess bond return, and Credit Spread is the Moody’s Baa yield minus 
the average yield on long-term Treasuries. Panel E summarizes the ratio of government debt to GDP, the ratio of 
government debt to total credit market debt, annual GDP growth, as well as a recession dummy based on NBER 
dating conventions. All variables, except for M and the Recession Dummy, are expressed in percentage terms. 
 
  Mean Median  SD  Min  Max  Ρ 








C d d   21.57 21.28  4.14 14.75 30.13  0.58 




C D D   83.41 83.69  3.36 77.00 89.75  0.76 




G D D   59.09 58.78  8.94 41.74 72.48  0.95 
M (years)  4.51 4.57 0.90 2.82 5.75 0.96 
  Panel D: short rate, term spread, subsequent bond returns, and credit spread (%) 
ySt  6.01 5.41 2.99 0.96  16.86 0.74 
yLt – ySt  0.87 0.73 1.41  -1.60 3.75 0.63 
RLt+1 – ySt  0.98 0.22 9.81  -15.21  21.01  -0.10 
Credit Spread  2.01 1.84 0.80 0.59 3.85 0.69 
  Panel E: Other controls 
D
G/GDP   34.63 34.08  7.73 22.46 48.67  0.96 
D
G/D  17.47 17.86  3.42 11.39 26.33  0.84 
ΔLog(GDP)  3.25 3.48 1.99  -1.95 6.94 0.25 
Recession Dummy  0.26 0.00 0.44 0.00 1.00 0.38 
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Table 2. The maturity of corporate and government debt, 1963-2005: Univariate Regressions. OLS regressions 
of the maturity of corporate debt on the maturity of government debt.  The dependent variable is alternately the Flow 
of Funds corporate long-term level share, the Flow of Funds corporate long-term issue share, or the Compustat 
corporate long-term level share. The maturity of government debt is defined as either the share of government debt 
and coupon payments with maturity of one year or more ( /
G
L
G DD ), or the dollar weighted maturity of principal 
payments (M). The constant term is not reported. t-statistics, in brackets, are based on Newey-West (1987) standard 
errors allowing for two years of lags. 
 
 




G DD   -0.262   -0.249   -0.147  
 [-3.64]    [-4.21]    [-1.83]   
M   -1.804   -1.949   -1.272 
   [-2.64]   [-2.85]   [-1.67] 
R
2  0.22 0.11 0.29 0.18 0.15 0.12   43
Table 3. The maturity of corporate and government debt, 1963-2005: Multivariate regressions.  OLS regressions of the maturity of corporate debt on the 
maturity of government debt, controlling for the short-term rate, the term spread, and a time trend.  The dependent variable is alternately the Flow of Funds 
corporate long-term level share, the Flow of Funds corporate long-term issue share, or the Compustat long-term level share. The maturity of government debt is 
defined as either the share of government debt and coupon payments with maturity of one year or more ( /
GG
L DD ), or the dollar weighted maturity of principal 
payments (M). The constant term is not reported. t-statistics, in brackets, are based on Newey-West (1987) standard errors allowing for two years of lags. 
 
 
  FOF: Levels  FOF: Issues  Compustat: Levels 




G DD   -0.296 -0.387     -0.278 -0.318      -0.169  -0.228   
  [-5.14] [-5.45]     [-5.00] [-5.77]      [-1.96]  [-2.33]     
M     -2.540  -3.488    -2.526  -2.939     -1.474 -2.094 
     [-4.31]  [-4.03]    [-4.68]  [-5.64]      [-1.80]  [-2.05] 
ySt  -1.214 -1.263 -1.317 -1.404 -0.815 -0.836 -0.919 -0.957 0.155 0.123 0.095 0.038 
  [-2.93] [-3.55] [-2.87] [-3.43] [-5.02] [-5.81] [-4.97] [-5.45] [0.60] [0.48] [0.35] [0.14] 
yLt – ySt  -0.613 -1.257 -0.781 -1.436 -0.207 -0.486 -0.355 -0.641 0.919 0.504 0.824 0.395 
  [-1.11] [-2.72] [-1.30] [-2.94] [-0.48] [-1.08] [-0.74] [-1.31] [1.77] [0.88] [1.48] [0.66] 
Trend   0.160   0.154   0.069   0.067    0.103    0.101 
   [2.26]   [1.78]   [2.07]   [1.71]    [1.62]    [1.38] 
R
2  0.63 0.73 0.55 0.64 0.59 0.61 0.52 0.54  0.25  0.34  0.20  0.29   44
Table 4. Robustness checks. Regressions of the maturity of corporate debt on the maturity of government debt. We vary the basic specification in row (1) by: 
(2) using only the first half of the sample period; (3) using only the second half of the sample period; (4) extending the FOF data back to 1953; (5) controlling for 
a dummy that takes a value of one when the NBER has designated any quarter of that year to be a recession; (6) controlling for two leads and two lags of the 
NBER recession dummy; (7) controlling for two leads and two lags of changes in log GDP; (8) controlling for the credit spread, defined as the Moody’s Baa 
yield minus the average yield on long-term Treasuries; (9) using a longer-dated proxy for the maturity of government debt (the fraction of debt due in more than 
10 years). In the last two rows, we instrument for government debt maturity using the ratio of government debt to GDP: (10) presents IV estimates for our 
baseline specification; (11) adds the credit spread as a control. All t-statistics are based on Newey-West (1987) standard errors allowing for two years of lags. All 
regressions include a constant term and controls for the short-term rate, the term spread, and a time trend, none of which are reported. 
 
  FOF: Levels  FOF: Issues  Compustat: Levels 
  b [t] R
2 b  [t]  R
2 b  [t]  R
2 
O L S :            
(1) Baseline   -0.387  [-5.45]  0.73  -0.318  [-5.77]  0.61  -0.228  [-2.33]  0.34 
(2) First half (1963-1983)  -0.203  [-1.84]  0.58  -0.266  [-3.34]  0.52  0.163  [1.88]  0.58 
(3) Second half (1984-2005)  -0.371  [-3.63]  0.95  -0.477  [-2.97]  0.71  -0.787  [-11.68]  0.92 
(4) Long sample (1953-2005)  -0.303  [-3.99]  0.70  -0.269  [-4.72]  0.60  -  -  - 
(5) Control for Business Cycle  -0.385  [-5.42]  0.73  -0.316  [-5.62]  0.61  -0.267  [-3.53]  0.49 
(6) Business Cycle leads and lags   -0.383  [-4.64]  0.74  -0.381  [-8.13]  0.77  -0.305  [-4.02]  0.62 
(7) ΔLog(GDP) leads and lags  -0.373  [-5.20]  0.74  -0.383  [-6.30]  0.73  -0.280  [-3.37]  0.57 
(8) Control for credit spread   -0.466  [-7.52]  0.76  -0.328  [-5.80]  0.61  -0.308  [-3.34]  0.41 
(9) Long-dated proxy for gov debt  -0.729  [-4.66]  0.66  -0.581  [-5.50]  0.54  -0.382  [-1.85]  0.25 
           
Instrumental Variables:           
(10) Baseline   -0.395  [-4.89]  0.73  -0.402  [-5.33]  0.59  -0.242  [-2.59]  0.34 
(11) Control for credit spread  -0.539  [-6.41]  0.75  -0.488  [-4.87]  0.55  -0.392  [-4.35]  0.39 
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dda b DD u
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The dependent variable is alternately , /
C
L tt dd , the Flow of Funds long-term corporate issue share, or  ( ) , /
CC
kL tt DD Δ , the change in either the Flow of Funds or 
the Compustat long-term corporate level share over a k-year window.  The independent variable is  () , /
GG
kL tt DD Δ , the change in the long-term government share 
over a k-year window. The constant term is not reported. t-statistics are based on Newey-West (1987) standard errors allowing for two years of lags.  
 
  FOF Issues  Changes in FOF Levels  Changes in Compustat Levels 
  b [t] R
2 b  [t]  R
2 b  [t]  R
2 
k=1  lag  -0.309 [-1.30]  0.04 -0.179 [-1.23]  0.06 -0.211 [-1.84]  0.07 
k=2  lags -0.331 [-2.26]  0.12 -0.265 [-1.64]  0.13 -0.273 [-2.10]  0.13 
k=3  lags -0.287 [-2.72]  0.16 -0.282 [-1.71]  0.16 -0.237 [-1.86]  0.13 
k=4  lags -0.285 [-3.86]  0.25 -0.308 [-2.07]  0.21 -0.228 [-1.96]  0.16 
k=5  lags  -0.289 [-4.63]  0.33 -0.325 [-2.18]  0.24 -0.230 [-2.00]  0.19 
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Table 6. GLS regressions. Generalized least squares regressions of the maturity of corporate debt on the maturity of government debt, controlling for the short-
term rate, the term spread, and a time trend.  The dependent variable is alternately the Flow of Funds corporate long-term level share, the Flow of Funds 
corporate long-term issue share, or the Compustat long-term level share.  The maturity of government debt is defined as the share of government debt and coupon 
payments with maturity of one year or more ( /
G
L
G DD ). The constant term is not reported. t-statistics for GLS regressions, in brackets, are computed using 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. We also report the estimated first-order autocorrelation of the residuals, denoted by ρ. 
 
 




G DD   -0.187 -0.130 -0.130 -0.238 -0.276 -0.316 -0.212 -0.194 -0.209 
  [-1.44] [-1.20] [-1.21] [-2.60] [-4.70] [-6.16] [-1.73] [-1.85] [-2.05] 
ySt   -0.290 -0.300   -0.780 -0.826   -0.274  -0.259 
   [-1.14] [-1.15]   [-3.78] [-4.60]   [-1.14] [-1.04] 
yLt – ySt   0.299 0.284    -0.100  -0.437   0.155 0.145 
   [0.79] [0.73]    [-0.21]  [-1.02]   [0.40] [0.36] 
Trend     0.101    0.066    0.087 
     [0.65]    [1.95]    [1.16] 
R
2  0.62 0.66 0.73 0.25 0.53 0.59 0.87 0.88 0.90 
ρ  0.96 0.97 0.96 0.43 0.16 0.05 0.80 0.82 0.77 
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Table 7. The effect of government-bond-market size on gap-filling intensity. This table presents regressions of 
the following form: 
() ( ) ( ) ,, , , // / /
C C GG GG GG
L t t Lt t t t Lt t Lt t t t d d a b D D c Scale d Scale D D e time f time D D u ′ =+⋅ +⋅ +⋅ × +⋅ +⋅ × + + θ x  
The dependent variable is the Flow of Funds corporate issue share. Scalet is either the ratio of government debt to 
GDP, or the ratio of government debt to total credit market debt.  The constant term is not reported. t-statistics, in 
brackets, are based on Newey-West (1987) standard errors allowing for two years of lags.  
 




G DD   0.640 0.351 1.188 0.845 
  [2.79] [1.49] [2.44] [2.12] 
Scale  2.906 0.957 4.795 2.442 




G D D Scale ×   -4.400 -1.941 -7.622 -4.918 
  [-4.49] [-1.77] [-3.03] [-2.21] 
time  -0.916  -0.268 0.957 0.491 




G D D time×   0.017 0.006  -0.013  -0.009 
  [1.77]  [0.87] [-1.58] [-2.06] 
ySt   -0.920   -0.889 
   [-4.08]    [-5.08] 
yLt – ySt   -0.293    -0.260 
   [-0.58]   [-0.58] 
R
2  0.52 0.71 0.45 0.71 
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Table 8. Disaggregated results by firm type, 1963-2005. OLS regressions of the Compustat long-term level share 
on the government long-term level share, disaggregated by firm type.  Each year, nonfinancial firms are classified as 
low (below 30
th percentile) or high (greater than 70
th percentile) with respect to: market capitalization; cash flow 
over assets; cash balances over assets; Tobin’s Q; and book leverage.  They are also classified as either dividend 
payers or non-payers.  All regressions include a constant term and controls for the short-term rate, the term spread, 
and a time trend, none of which are reported.  t-statistics are based on Newey-West (1987) standard errors allowing 
for two years of lags. In the final column of each row, we report the difference between the coefficients for the high 
and low groups along with a t-test for whether this difference is significantly different from zero. The t-statistics are 
calculated using a seemingly unrelated regression framework with Newey-West standard errors allowing for two 
years of lags. 
 
  Low  High  High – Low 
  b [t]  b [t]  b
High - b
Low [t] 
All Compustat Nonfinancial  -0.228  [-2.33]       
          
 Market Capitalization  0.024  [0.43]  -0.286  [-2.50]  -0.310  [-2.18] 
Non-payers (“low”); Payers (“high”)  -0.043  [-0.83]  -0.263  [-2.30]  -0.220  [-1.91] 
Cash Flow/Assets  0.073  [1.35]  -0.125  [-1.42]  -0.198  [-1.94] 
Cash/Assets -0.059  [-0.39]  -0.215  [-2.53]  -0.156  [-1.07] 
Tobin’s Q  -0.318  [-3.09]  -0.063  [-0.69]  0.255  [1.97] 
Leverage -0.375  [-3.19]  -0.367  [-2.88]  0.008  [0.06] 
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Table 9. Corporate debt maturity, government debt maturity, and excess bond returns, 1953-2005.  Annual regressions of 1-year, 2-year, and 3-year log 
excess bond returns on combinations of the long-term government share, the Flow of Funds long-term corporate level share, and the Flow of Funds long-term 
corporate issue share.  t-statistics, in brackets, are adjusted for up to 3 lags of autocorrelation based on Newey-West (1987). 
 





t DD   0.225   0.185   0.170 0.523   0.394   0.388 0.824   0.580   0.576 
  [2.10]   [1.19]   [1.39] [2.78]    [-1.59]   [1.77] [3.22]   [1.83]   [2.00] 
, /
CC
Lt t dd    -0.337 -0.163       -0.912 -0.542     -1.588  -1.045   
    [-1.07]  [-0.42]     [-2.24]  [-1.07]     [-2.64]  [-1.52]   
, /
CC
Lt t D D       -0.312  -0.206     -0.778  -0.531     -1.408  -1.034 
      [-1.58]  [-0.91]     [-2.26]  [1.30]     [-3.05]  [1.95] 
R
2  0.04 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.12 0.09 0.15 0.11 0.17 0.19 0.17 0.25 0.20 0.28 
 
 